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I. INTRODUCTION 1
American tort law, through its wrong of negligence, may apply
lower liability than the reasonable person standard to a defendant
while French fault-based tort liability will always hold a tortfeasor
liable for his unreasonable behavior. Indeed, under American law,
the plaintiff must prove four elements to hold the defendant liable:
the existence of a duty of care, its breach, damage, and causation
which is further divided into two parts: cause in fact (as
determined under the “but for” test requiring that the plaintiff’s
harm would not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct) and
proximate cause (implying foreseeability of the damage). 2 Thus,
1. This article is dealing only with wrongful liability and not strict liability,
which covers two situations in French law (one’s strict liability for damage
caused by things or persons in one’s custody) that probably plays a more
important role than in American tort law.
2. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 114, at 269 (West 2001).

2015]

SCOPE OF THE DUTY OF CARE

33

not all unreasonable behavior causing damage to the victim leads
to liability for the defendant. The tortfeasor must first owe a duty
to act reasonably toward the victim, so that the breach thereof can
cause him to be liable in negligence to the plaintiff for the damage
he brought about. If he is not under such a duty or is bound to a
lighter duty, he is excused from liability, causing American tort
law to be relative. 3 American scholars mostly justified this solution
through the protection of the country’s common economic good.
Certain actors are to be released from the duty to act reasonably or
bound only to a lighter duty when such release far better promotes
economic competitiveness and efficiency. 4
To the contrary, France doctrine provides for fault-based tort
liability as applied under the single liability clause embodied in the
French Civil Code’s articles 1382 and 1383, 5 which governs all of
one’s intentional and negligent liability. Here, a defendant is liable
if three elements are met: a fault (also known as “breach”),
damage, and causation. 6 In other words, everyone is bound to a
general duty of reasonable care and is found liable for the damage
he caused to a victim as soon as he proved to have behaved
unreasonably. It need not be shown that the tortfeasor owed the
victim a specific duty of care in the first place for liability to

3. Jean Limpens, Robert M. Kruithof & Anne Meinertzhagen-Limpens,
Liability for One’s Own Act, in [XI/1, Torts] INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, § 2-147, at 70 (André Tunc ed., Martinus Nijhoff Pubs.
1983).
4. MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW §55.04, at 308 (2d ed.,
Thomson West 2003).
5. Civil Code art. 1382 reads: “Any act whatever of man, which causes
damage to another, obliges the one by whose fault it occurred, to compensate it.”
And art. 1383 provides that “[e]veryone is liable for the damage he causes not
only by his intentional act, but also by his negligent conduct or by his
imprudence.”
6. See GENEVIÈVE VINEY & PATRICE JOURDAIN, LES CONDITIONS DE LA
RESPONSABILITÉ, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL, § 246, at 1 (3d ed., Jacques Gesthin
ed., L.G.D.J. 2006); WALTER VAN GERVEN, JEREMY LEVER & PIERRE
LAROUCHE, COMMON LAW OF EUROPE CASEBOOKS, TORT LAW at 2-3 (Hart
Publ’g 2000).
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apply. 7 Accordingly, French fault-based tort liability is deemed to
constitute a “general principle of liability for fault.” 8
At first sight, this discrepancy of the scope of wrongful liability
may be explained by the different ways these two countries deal
with one’s liability under multiple torts or a single one. On the one
hand, the United States uses separate torts, inherited from English
law, to deal with each liability situation. Negligence is just the
specific tort that handles the liability of those who behave
carelessly. 9 On the other hand, France implements a single liability
clause that provides for the liability of all of those who
intentionally or negligently breach the duty of reasonable care. 10
Nevertheless, the American tort of negligence is very close to the
French single liability clause. Like its French counterpart, it
actually creates a general duty of care upon individuals who are
held liable if they negligently (or even intentionally 11) breach it
and cause the victim damage. It is a general, “catch-all” liability
rule which potentially offers endless protection against all
wrongful misconducts to such extent that a duty of (reasonable or
limited) care exists. 12 In this sense, it is very similar to the French
7. VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 441, at 364-66; PHILIPPE
MALAURIE, LAURENT AYNÈS & PHILIPPE STOFFEL-MUNCK, LES OBLIGATIONS §
53, at 30 (5th ed., Defrénois 2011); FRANCOIS TERRÉ, PHILIPPE SIMLER & YVES
LEQUETTE, LES OBLIGATIONS, DROIT CIVIL § 729, at 701 (8th ed. Dalloz 2002);
Limpens et al., supra note 3, § 2-5, at 5, §2-23, at 13; VAN GERVEN ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 2-3.
8. See, e.g., Geneviève Viney, Pour ou contre un principe général de
responsabilité civile pour faute?, 49 OSAKA UNIV. L. REV. 33, 34 (2002);
MALAURIE ET AL., supra note 7, § 52, at 29-30.
9. MALAURIE ET AL., supra note 7, § 1, at 2-3; Limpens et al., supra note 3,
§ 2-16 & 2-17, at 10-11.
10. VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 450, at 380; Limpens et al., supra
note 3, § 2-5, at 5, §2-23, at 13; VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 2-3.
11. However, in practice, when an American lawyer can argue both the
existence of an intentional tort and negligence in a case, he will often choose the
intentional tort, because it sometimes has a slightly broader scope and appears
more outrageous for judges and juries who are inclined to award higher
damages.
12. Limpens et al., supra note 3, § 2-18, at 5; CHRISTIAN VON BAR, 1 THE
COMMON EUROPEAN LAW OF TORTS § 274, at 297-98 (Clarendon Press 1998);
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 62324 (3d ed., Tony Weir trans., Clarendon Press 1998).
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single liability clause, and the undertaking of a comparison
between these two grounds of liability proves very relevant. 13
Therefore, the issue of the determination of the scope of
tortfeasors’ liability for fault needs to be addressed in both
countries to assess whether France really abides by general faultbased tort liability or if it actually implements relative tort liability
to ensure its economic well-being, like the United States. This
study claims that France departs from its general principle of
liability for fault and instead applies relative tort liability like
American law by diverting the prima facie case of one’s liability
for fault (especially the force majeure defense, causation and the
duty itself). Thus, people in France are not always bound to the
duty of reasonable care. They may be under limited liability with
no duty of reasonable care at all, or only a lighter one. It is up to
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant breached a duty and caused
him damage in order to hold him civilly responsible. Otherwise,
like in American negligence, he is excused from liability.
It must be emphasized that this piece will rely on hypotheses of
both French tort and contract liability for the sake of its analysis.
This is based on the fact that French contract law has a broader
scope than American contract law and provides for liability that is
usually covered in torts in America. Indeed, in American contract
law, the general rule is that when a party fails to achieve the
promised results and breaches the contract, 14 he is liable for the
other contracting party’s lost profit (expectations damages). 15 If he
also happens to be negligent while performing his contract, he will
be held accountable in tort for the property damage and personal
injury he caused, unless there is an explicit or implied warranty
13. GENEVIÈVE VINEY & BASIL MARKENIS, LA RÉPARATION DU DOMMAGE
CORPOREL, ESSAI DE COMPARAISON DES DROITS ANGLAIS ET FRANÇAIS § 12, at

11 (Economica 1985).
14. This paper does not deal with other remedy issues such as the
termination of the contract for material breach.
15. ANTHONY M. SKROCKI & CLAUDE D. ROHWER, CONTRACTS IN A
NUTSHELL §9-2, at 315 (6th ed., Thomson West 2006).
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granting the victim such recovery in contracts as well. 16 On the
contrary, in France, when two parties freely enter into a contact,
they are usually liable in contracts for the damage they cause to
each other in the course of the performance of the contract, 17
especially for the damage that a third party would not otherwise
suffer. 18 Tort liability cannot add up in these cases. 19 Accordingly,
when a party breaches the contract, the breached party is entitled to
expectation damages exactly like in American law. 20 Then, when
specifically performing a contract requiring the achievement of
some work, a party is deemed to be bound to an additional
covenant to act like a reasonable person, causing him to be liable
under this covenant to the opposing party for his property damage
and personal injury if he fails to do so. This covenant similar to a
warranty of workmanlike performance can be express 21 or implied
(especially in service contracts) 22 in the law. Sometimes, French
case law even adds to the contract a specific warranty to assure the
other contracting party’s safety during the performance of the
16. EDWARD J. KIONKA, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL §10-1, at 191 (4th ed.,
Thomson West 2004).
17. See GENEVIÈVE VINEY, INTRODUCTION A LA RESPONSABILITÉ, TRAITÉ
DE DROIT CIVIL § 185, at 327 (2d ed., Jacques Gesthin ed., L.G.D.J. 1995).
18. Specifically when based on the warranty to ensure someone’s safety.
See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 501, at 470.
19. This is to offer actors the possibility to provide for liability limits
(unless they commit intentional misconduct, or gross negligence, or they are
accordingly entitled to a way out of the contract) that are only legal in contracts
and not in torts. See VINEY, supra note 17, § 220, at 407.
20. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 251-2, at 31.
21. For instance, Civil Code art. 1880 reads regarding a loan for use: “[t]he
borrower is bound to take care of the keeping and preservation of the thing
loaned like a prudent owner.”
22. Ex.1: A customer enters into a contract with a mechanic to change his
car’s brakes under French law. The mechanic fails to install the promised
brakes. He is liable for the contract breach to the customer, and the customer
may recover from him the extra costs he had to pay to another mechanic to
install the right brakes.
Ex. 2: Same facts as in example 1, except that he installs the proper brakes in a
defective way, and the customer gets into a car accident causing him to be
injured and his car to be damaged. The mechanic is deemed here to be bound to
an implied extra warranty of workmanlike performance. Therefore, the customer
will recover for his bodily injury and property damage based on the breach
thereof by the mechanic.
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contract to allow such compensation. 23 Moreover, while a party
breaching the contract by failing to achieve the promised result is
strictly liable for his breach like in American law, 24 the party
bound to such warranties has usually to use only his best efforts to
act reasonably while performing the contract and he is only liable
for failing to do so (i.e., for fault). 25 Thus, such liability for breach
of warranties under French law relates more to tort law like in
American law. As a result, this paper will integrate it into its
analysis of the scope of limited French torts.
This study will start by emphasizing the American relative
principle of negligence liability (Part II). Then, it will describe the
traditional general principle of liability for fault in French law (Part
III). Furthermore, France’s implied limitations on the scope of the
defendant’s liability for fault will be addressed (Part IV). Lastly, a
new approach officially establishing the existence of a limited duty
of care in French fault-based tort law will be suggested (Part V).
II. AMERICAN RELATIVE PRINCIPLE OF NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY
Inherited from English law, American negligence proves
relative through the implementation of the duty element and
proximate cause that limit the defendant’s duty of reasonable
care. 26 The defendant must breach a duty of care to which he owes
the plaintiff and be able to foresee the risks created by his conduct
to be held liable for the damage he caused to the victim. If he is
under no duty or cannot predict the damaging result, he is not
guilty of negligence. This paper will first deal with the duty of
23. VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 499, at 453; VAN GERVEN ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 281.
24. In French law, this party is said to be bound to an obligation de résultat,
i.e., to achieve a specific result. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 541, at
526.
25. French law qualifies this covenant as an obligation de moyen, i.e., to use
one’s best effort to perform it. However, it may be upgraded to an obligation de
résultat to enhance the defendant’s liability. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note
6, § 541, at 526.
26. See discussion, supra Part I.
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reasonable care as applied in negligence (A). Then, it will address
the limits that the existence of a lower duty and proximate cause
create on the scope of the defendant’s duty (B). This present study
will not talk about cause in fact and damage, because they do not
come into play in defining one’s liability limits.
A. Breach of the Duty of Reasonable Care
At first glance, the defendant is held liable when he breaches
his duty of reasonable care (1). This breach is assessed according
to several methods (2).
1. Definition of the Duty of Reasonable Care
The defendant breaches his duty of reasonable care when he
behaves negligently (a). This can be varied by certain
circumstances (b).
a. Exercise of Reasonable Care
The default rule is that people owe a general duty of reasonable
care to their neighbors. 27 This means that they have to avoid
injuring others by negligent conduct. It does not impose a duty to
avoid all injury to others. The English landmark case Blyth v.
Birmingham Waterworks Co. is one of the first cases to give the
definition of reasonable care. 28 This case involved a constructor
who had installed a water main in the street with fireplugs at
various points. During an extremely cold winter, the frost caused
the freezing water in the main to break force out the connection
between some plugs and the water main. Later, when the main
thawed, the water in it leaked out and flooded the plaintiff’s house.
The trial court found the constructor guilty of negligence and
awarded the homeowner damages.

27. See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 117, at 277.
28. Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1856).
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The Court of Exchequer reversed the decision. It held that
“negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of human affairs would do or doing something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do.” 29 Here, the extreme
severity of the frost in the year when the damage occurred proved
exceptional compared to the usual weather in the area. A
reasonable man would not have taken precautions against such
extraordinary frosts. Therefore, the defendant was reasonable in
not planning for this weather and could not be accountable for
negligence.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 282 confirms that
the defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable care causes him to be
liable for negligence: “Negligence is conduct which falls below the
standard established by law for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk of harm. It does not include conduct recklessly
disregardful.”
b. Influence of Certain Circumstances
Even though the standard of reasonable care is an objective
standard, it depends on specific circumstances. It is said that the
defendant must exercise the care that a reasonable and prudent
person under the same circumstances would have exercised to
avoid risks of harm to others. 30 First, external circumstances can
relax the standard of reasonable care. Thus, in case of an
emergency, the actor’s behavior is evaluated by comparison to the
conduct that a reasonable and prudent person would have adopted
in this dangerous situation. He is not liable if the reasonable and
prudent person would have acted alike, even though in retrospect
another course of action would have avoided the damage. 31
29. Id.
30. See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 117, at 277.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 296 (ALI 1965); see DOBBS,
supra note 2, § 129, at 304.
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Secondly, the law takes into account the personal
circumstances of the actor. On the one hand, this may lead to
lighten the standard of reasonable care, especially for those that are
of a young age 32 or physically disabled 33 (but not those mentally
deficient in intelligence, judgment, memory, etc., the insane, and
the intoxicated 34). Thus, a minor 35 or a physically disabled
person 36 is required to adhere to the standard of reasonable care of
a minor of the same age or a disabled person affected by the same
physical handicap. They are not required to meet the same standard
of behavior as adults or those with normal physical capacity. That
would be too high a burden to hold them liable for failing to
conform to an impossible standard of physical conduct or maturity.
On the other hand, special knowledge, skills, and experience may
strengthen the standard of reasonable care. This usually involves
professionals who perform licensed activities or occupations
(physicians, attorneys, pilots, motorists, etc.) which cause the
public to rely on them to supply services of quality. Therefore, the
actor is held to a specific standard of reasonable care in the sense
that he has to act like a reasonable and prudent person with such
expertise, and not only with common knowledge. 37
2. Method for Determining the Breach of the Duty of Care
The plaintiff has to establish that the defendant breached his
duty of reasonable care by failing to act like a reasonable and
prudent person in order to hold him liable for negligence. The
general method for determining whether the defendant breached
32. See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 124, at 293.
33. Id. § 119, at 282.
34. Id. § 120, at 284.
35. Unless he engages in an adult’s activities (such as operating a car or
flying an airplane), in which case he is held to an adult standard of care; see,
e.g., DOBBS, supra note 2, § 125, at 298.
36. Unless a reasonable and prudent disabled person would have behaved
like a non-disabled person; see, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 2, § 119, at 282.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289; see DOBBS, supra note 2, §
122, at 290.
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such a duty is to apply the risk-utility balancing test, defined by
Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Caroll Towing Co. (a). 38
Customs and statutes can also impact the establishment of the duty
of reasonable care (b).
a. Risk-Utility Balancing Test
In the Caroll Towing case, the owner of a barge hired a tug to
move a barge containing a cargo of flooring materials belonging to
the United States. However, the tug employees negligently moored
the barge to a pier. As a result, the barge broke away from its
mooring and hit a tanker’s propeller, which tore a hole in the
barge, eventually sinking it. The barge owner sought compensation
from the tug owner for the cost of the cargo, for which he was
accountable to the United States, and the loss of its barge. Yet the
tug owner claimed that the barge owner had been contributorily
negligent in not being continuously on board, and that he had to be
found partially responsible for the loss of the cargo and the barge.
Thus, the issue was whether it was reasonable for the barge owner
not to have a bargee or attendant continuously present on board.
Judge Learned Hand set out his formula to determine whether
the barge owner was liable:
It is a function of three variables: (1) the probability that
[the barge] will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting
injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions.
Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in
algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury L;
and the burden B; liability depends upon whether B is less
than L multiplied by P; i.e, whether B is less than PL. 39
Here, the accident occurred during World War II, when war
activities caused barges to be constantly moved in and out of the
crowded harbor. Therefore, the likelihood that the job of tying up
the barge to the pier could not have been done with adequate care
38. United States v. Caroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
39. Id. at 173.
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was fairly high. Moreover, the injury to the vessel was likely to be
significant because of the presence of a large number of boats in
comparison to the size of the harbor. Finally, the burden imposed
on the barge owner to maintain an attendant on board was low,
because the accident happened in winter, when the working hours
of the employees in the harbor were shortened as the result of the
fewer hours of daylight. Therefore, the burden of continuously
having an employee on board was less than the probability of
accident multiplied by the expected loss. In conclusion, the barge
owner was held contributorily negligent in not having a member of
his staff constantly present on board and received only partial
compensation for his damage. 40
b. Impact of Customs and Statutes on the Duty of Reasonable
Care
Courts can also use complementary methods for establishing
the duty of reasonable care. First, they can rely on customs. For
instance, this covers the situation where the plaintiff argues that the
defendant was negligent because he did not follow the customary
practices in his business field. In this case, the custom is said to be
used as a sword. Conversely, the defendant can assert that he
followed the customary practice to prove that he did not act
unreasonably and was careful. Here, he uses the custom as a shield.
Generally, courts consider that customary practices do not set the
standard of care, which remains the standard of a reasonable and
prudent person under the same circumstances. It only gives some
evidence of what this standard is. 41
Second, judges can refer to the standards of conduct prescribed
by statutory provisions to determine the duty of reasonable care.
Not only do these include statutes passed by Congress and the state
legislatures, but they also encompass municipal ordinances,
40. This standard has been adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§
291-293.
41. See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 163, at 393.
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administrative regulations and even constitutions. 42 Then, to be
admissible as a tort law standard of reasonable care, the statute
must have been intended to protect a class of persons that includes
the plaintiff against the particular risk of injury neglected by the
defendant. 43 Finally, the statute may have varied weight when it is
applied. In a few states, the violation of a statute is negligence per
se and the defendant is automatically considered negligent. 44 In the
majority of states, the defendant who violates a statute is presumed
negligent, and he can rebut this presumption of negligence with
contrary evidence. 45 In the other states (forming a considerable
minority of states), the violation of a statute is merely evidence of
negligence, meaning that the statute is considered together with
other evidence to determine whether the defendant was negligent
according to the Hand Formula. 46
To hold the defendant liable, the plaintiff must also prove that
the defendant’s negligence in failing to take the reasonable
precautions to avoid injuring him falls within the scope of the duty
to which the defendant owes the plaintiff.
B. Means to Limit the Scope of the Defendant’s Duty of Care
To constitute actionable negligence, the defendant’s negligent
conduct must fall within the scope of the duty that he owes to the
victim. Traditionally, American law limited the scope of the
defendant’s liability by requiring that he was under such a duty to
act reasonably and proximate cause was shown (1). Presently,,
both of these principles are actually considered to relate to the
same issue of the delimitation of the scope of the defendant’s duty
of care-based public policies (2).

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. § 133, at 311.
Id. § 137, at 323-26.
Id. § 134, at 315; See KIONKA, supra note 16, at 78.
See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 134, at 315.
Id. § 134, at 317.
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1. Traditional Limitations by Duty and Proximate Cause
The defendant’s liability was traditionally limited by the
application of the duty element (a) and proximate cause (b).
a. Duty
Following the English common law of torts, American
negligence law has always applied restrictions on the general duty
of reasonable care when its enforcement would lead to unfair
results. 47 Many categories of specific duties may actually
overcome the general duty of reasonable care. 48 On the one hand,
the defendant may owe no duty at all. He can never be held
negligently liable, even though his conduct was unreasonably
risky. 49 On the other hand, he may owe only a limited duty and the
plaintiff will have to prove aggravated negligence. 50 For instance,
the orthodox view is that no one owes a duty to act affirmatively to
rescue someone else in the absence of some special relationship.
Thus, a defendant could not be held liable for negligence because
he watched a person with a visual disability step in front of a car
and did not call out to him, even if it created no inconvenience or
danger to do so. 51
The determination of the existence and measure of the
defendant’s duty is decided by judges based on policy
considerations, such as the extent to which the transaction was
intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of the harm to the
plaintiff, the degree of certainty of injury to him, the closeness of
the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. § 111, at 262.
Id. § 225, at 575.
Id. § 117, at 277.
Id. § 117, at 277.
Id. § 227, at 579.
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policy of preventing future harm by deterrence, and the
administrative problem for courts in enforcing the duty. 52
b. Proximate Cause
The second mechanism by which the law has cordoned off
one’s liability is proximate cause. At the outset, it must be
emphasized that proximate cause is different from cause in fact.
Here, causation is established as the defendant’s conduct is a
necessary antecedent of the victim’s damage. 53 Proximate cause
rather looks upon policy considerations and holds that the
defendant is liable only if, at the time he acted, he could reasonably
foresee that the specific risk that his negligent conduct created
would injure the victim. 54 It is a jury question that distinguishes it
from duty. 55
The Wagon Mound case, decided in England, illustrates this
idea very well. 56 In this case, a ship discharged some oil into the
water of the port of Sydney, near the dock where the plaintiff’s
employees were doing welding work. This oil fouled the plaintiff’s
dock. However, due to its high ignition point, the oil was unlikely
to burn. But, randomly, some cotton waste was floating in the oil
underneath the dock and caught fire when the worker dropped
some molten metal on it. This ignited the oil, and the plaintiff’s
dock burned down. The plaintiff argued that, since the defendant
could foresee that his oil spill could cause the plaintiff some injury
by fouling his dock, he should be held liable for the entire damage
which actually happened, the fire included. Nonetheless, the Privy
Council held that the plaintiff could only recover for the injuries
that the defendant should have anticipated at the time it released
52. See, e.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379
P2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
53. See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 182, at 447.
54. Id. § 180, at 444.
55. Id. § 182, at 449.
56. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (the
“Wagon Mound”), [1961] A.C. 388 (Privy Council 1961).
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the oil into the water. Thus, he could recover only for the fouled
docks, but not for the fire that was unforeseeable.
Following this case, it was later decided that it is the general
risk/harm that must be foreseeable and not the special mechanism
that brought it about. 57 In short, it is considered that the defendant
is actually released from liability because there is an intervening,
superseding event that makes the occurrence of the damage
completely unpredictable. 58 For instance, there is such an
unpredictable, superseding cause when “a bizarre, unforeseeable
event gives rise to a risk different from the one the defendant
should have anticipated.” 59 The same also happens when a third
party unexpectedly commits an intentional tort, such as a crime. 60
Accordingly, this actually creates a limit to the duty of
reasonable care. One may not be liable while behaving
unreasonably by failing to prevent probable damage in general
from occurring to the victim. To be held accountable, he still has to
be able to foresee the specific damage caused to the defendant as
assessed under the reasonable person standard. As a result, he is
only bound to a limited duty to preclude the specific damage that
he could reasonably foresee. 61
2. Modern Means to Limit the Scope of the Defendant’s Duty of
Care Based on Public Policies
The modern approach limits the defendant’s liability by
requiring that the scope of his duty of care encompass the
plaintiff’s damage to hold him liable (a). This delimitation of the
scope of his duty of care is based on public policies (b).
57. See, e.g., Hughes v. Lord Advocate, A.C. 837 (H.L. 1962); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289; and DOBBS, supra note 2, § 184, at
454.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 186, at 460-661.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442; JOSEPH W. GLANNON,
THE LAW OF TORTS, EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 191 (3d ed., Aspen 2005).
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442; see GLANNON, supra
note 59, at 192.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 182, at 448.
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a. Principle
Both duty and proximate cause achieve the same purpose. They
ask the same policy question: should this particular defendant be
liable for this precise damage to this specific victim under those
special circumstances? 62 Thus, the defendant may no longer be
under the general duty of reasonable care. He may owe the victim
no duty at all, or he may be bound to a lighter duty that requires the
victim to prove aggravated negligence, such as gross negligence. 63
As a result, they should be combined into the united concept of the
scope of the defendant’s duty of care.
The famous Palsgraf case supports this view. 64 A passenger
dropped his package while the railroad company’s employees
helped him board a train that was leaving the station. The package
contained fireworks that exploded when the luggage hit the
ground. Then, a remote scale fell as a result of the blast and hit
another passenger, Mrs. Palsgaf, who was waiting further down on
the platform.
Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority, ruled that the
establishment of the train company’s duty of care and its ability to
foresee the risk caused by its conduct are actually related to the
same liability issue of the determination of the scope of its duty of
care. The defendant is negligently liable if the scope of his duty
encompasses the victim’s damage, and this is the case when he is
able to foresee the risks created for him. Here, the court deemed
that the risk of explosion caused by a passenger dropping his
luggage full of explosives while being helped to board the train
was foreseeable. However, it was not predictable that the blast
would knock a scale down onto a passenger standing hundreds of
feet away. Therefore, the railroad did not owe any duty to the
62. JOHN M. CHURCH, WILLIAM R. CORBETT, THOMAS E. RICHARD & JOHN
V. WHITE, TORT LAW – THE AMERICAN AND LOUISIANA PERSPECTIVES 187
(Vandeplas Publ’g 2008).
63. See SHAPO, supra note 4, §55.01, at 301.
64. Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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victim and was excused from liability. Thus, duty and proximate
cause constitute the same element requiring the scope of the
defendant’s duty of care to encompass the victim’s damage to
establish his liability. Whether the victim’s harm falls within the
scope of the defendant’s duty is a question of public policy usually
decided by judges.
b. Public Policies Driving the Limits on the Scope of the
Defendant’s Duty
As seen in Palsgraf case, the first and most common public
policy which limits the scope of the defendant’s liability is
foreseeability of the risk. Here, similarly to proximate cause, 65 one
is no longer required to behave reasonably to prevent probable risk
in general from occurring. He is only bound to a limited duty to
prevent the specific damage that he could reasonably foresee in
order to be held liable for it. 66
Regarding other public policies shaping the scope of the
defendant’s duty, Louisiana’s Pitre case 67 can be cited as an
example. 68 Here, a doctor negligently performed sterilization
surgery on a woman; she subsequently became pregnant and gave
birth to a child with albinism. The parents filed several actions to
get their various damages compensated. First, they brought a
wrongful pregnancy action. This action included the pain and
suffering and the expenses incurred during the unwanted
pregnancy and delivery, along with the economic cost of rearing an
unplanned child. They also filed a wrongful birth action for the
special expenses and the pain and suffering resulting from the
child’s deformity. Finally, they took a wrongful life action on
behalf of the child for his damage for having to live with a defect.
65. See discussion, supra Part II.B.1.b.
66. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
67. Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital, 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988).
68. Even if Louisiana is a mixed jurisdiction, it applies the common law
principles in tort law.
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The Louisiana Supreme Court enunciated the different public
policies that determine the scope of a defendant’s liability for the
damage caused to a victim. This scope depends on the
foreseeability of the risk, the moral aspect of the defendant’s
conduct, the need for compensation, the need for incentive to
prevent future harm, the relative ability of each class of litigants to
bear and distribute loss, the historical development of precedent,
and the efficient administration of the law. 69
In applying these factors, it was decided that the physician’s
duty did not extend to compensate the child’s defective life under
the wrongful pregnancy action and he was, accordingly, excused
from liability for it. Indeed, it would imply that the law values the
fact of not being born higher than the fact of being born, which the
High Court found inadmissible. 70 Then, the surgeon was relieved
from the parent’s wrongful birth action for the additional cost and
pain of raising a disabled child. This handicap was not deemed
foreseeable as a result of the surgery in reference to the scientific
knowledge at the time. 71 Finally, the court held that the doctor’s
duty encompassed the wrongful pregnancy action. But, it allowed
recovery only for the financial and psychological cost of the
pregnancy and delivery. It denied compensation for the normal
expenses of rearing a child, because a child is always “a
blessing”. 72
Unlike American law, French tort law does not seem to limit
the scope of the defendant’s duty of reasonable care in determining
his liability.

69. See Pitre, 530 So.2d at 1161.
70. Id. at 1158. Moreover, it is doubtful that causation was established. It
was the birth that was the cause in fact of the child’s defective life, and not the
doctor’s negligence; see, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 2, § 291, at 792.
71. See Pitre, 530 So.2d at 1162.
72. Id. at 1161-62.
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III. TRADITIONAL GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF LIABILITY FOR FAULT IN
FRENCH LAW
The French general principle of liability for fault is laid down
in Civil Code articles 1382 and 1383. 73 According to these
provisions, a defendant is held civilly responsible for his
intentional or negligent misconduct when three elements are met.
First, the defendant must have breached the duty of reasonable care
to which everyone is bound. This element is called “fault” in
France. Second, the plaintiff has to suffer damages that are of the
same types as in American law. Third, some causation similar to
American “cause in fact” needs to be proven. 74 There is no
additional element that would limit the scope of the tortfeasor’s
liability under certain circumstances. He is liable as soon as he
behaved unreasonably and caused the victim damage. This section
will address the general issue of fault which sets the general faultbased liability rule by dividing it into two aspects: the definition of
fault as objective unlawful conduct (A), and its assessment based
on the only standard of reasonable care (B). Damage and causation
will not be dealt with in this part, since they apparently do not
come into play in defining the limits on one’s liability.
A. Definition of Fault as Objective Unlawful Behavior
The concept of fault has evolved from subjective unlawful
behavior (1) to objective illicit conduct (2).
1. Classical Subjective Approach of Fault
In the past, fault consisted of two elements. The first one
required a violation of a pre-existing duty by the defendant. In
73. See supra note 5.
74. In France, this is called “the theory of equivalence of conditions” and it
is established when the damage would not have occurred but for the defendant’s
negligence. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 339, at 188, § 355, at 199;
MALAURIE ET AL., supra note 7, § 92, at 44; and VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra
note 6, at 419.
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other words, the fault was established when the actual conduct of
the tortfeasor was inconsistent with the conduct required by legal
duties. It was an objective element. 75 The second component
demanded that the unlawful conduct be imputable to the actor in
order to find him liable. This was the case if the actor had the
psychological capacity of understanding and accepting the
consequences of his conduct. This element was subjective. 76
2. Modern Objective Conception of Fault
Today, to establish the defendant’s fault, the plaintiff only has
to prove that he objectively acted in an unlawful way. There is no
longer need to demonstrate his conduct was imputable to him, i.e.,
he could understand that his conduct was unlawful. This evolution
took place in two successive steps.
First, the legislature passed the Act of January 1968 to make
mentally deficient adults liable for their negligence. This law,
which was inserted in the Civil Code at article 489-2, reads: “A
person who has caused damage to another when he was under the
influence of a mental disorder is nonetheless liable to
compensation.” Thus, mentally disabled adults can now be held
liable for negligence, even though their mental deficiency prevents
them from realizing that their conduct is unlawful. The subjective
element of imputability is no longer required for them. 77
Then, the French Supreme Court for civil and criminal matters
(Cour de cassation), sitting in its highest form, overthrew the
requirement of imputability for children in four cases decided on
May 9, 1984. 78 For example, in one of them, the Justices held a 1375. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 443, at 367; see VAN GERVEN
supra note 6, at 301.
76. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 444, at 370; TERRÉ ET AL.,
supra note 7, § 732, at 703; and VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 301.
77. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 585, at 599; TERRE ET AL.,
supra note 7, § 733, at 704-705; and VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 332.
78. Ass. Plén., May 9, 1984, JCP, 1984, II, 20255, note Dejan de la Batie
(Fr.), 20256, note P. Jourdain (Fr.), and 20291, rapport Fédou (Fr.); D., 1984, p.
525, note F. Chabas (Fr.).
ET AL.,

52

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 8

year-old child contributorily negligent in being electrocuted after
he failed to disengage the circuit-breaker prior to screwing the bulb
on a light socket defectively assembled by an electrician. The
Supreme Court especially denied having to assess the child’s
awareness of the illegality of his conduct to be able to hold him
contributorily negligent. Thus, this decision shows that the actor
commits a fault as soon as he objectively acts unlawfully. It is no
longer required that his conduct was imputable to him.
French law only assesses the existence of fault based on a
breach of the legal duty of reasonable care.
B. Assessment of Fault Based on the Breach of the Duty of
Reasonable Care
The existence of fault is exclusively measured by reference to
the breach of the duty to behave as a reasonable and prudent
person placed under the same circumstances (1). This includes
negligent actions and omissions (2).
1. Benchmark of the Reasonable and Prudent Person Under
the Same Circumstances
Fault can first be established by the violation of the duty of
reasonable care laid down by statutory provisions. It obviously
includes conduct punished by criminal statutes passed by the
legislature. It also encompasses behavior prohibited by other
legislation enacted by the legislature or regulation decided by the
executive or the administration. 79 Unlike American law, these
statutes are unconditionally admissible as references of the
standard of reasonable care. 80 There is no requirement that they
were intended to protect the class of persons within which the
plaintiff falls against the specific risk created by the defendant.
Any violation of a mandatory statutory rule is also irrefutably
79. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 448, at 375; TERRÉ ET AL.,
supra note 7, § 718, at 694-95; and VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 305.
80. Id.
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illicit, and amounts to fault. The plaintiff does not need to prove
that the tortfeasor acted negligently, imprudently or carelessly, and
the defendant cannot bring in contrary evidence to be excused from
liability. 81
Furthermore, fault can result from the violation of the duty of
reasonable care defined by case law. Like American law, French
judges find defendants guilty of negligence when they did not act
like a reasonable and prudent person. This ideal person is called
the bonus pater familias or good family father, a standard inherited
from Roman law and never rephrased despite its sexist overtone. 82
This standard of the reasonable person is an objective one. It is
said that courts evaluate the defendant’s behavior in abstracto. 83
However, this in abstracto analysis does not prevent judges
from referring to the conduct of the reasonable and circumspect
person under certain similar circumstances to determine if the
defendant was at fault. 84 External circumstances of the defendant’s
conduct are taken into account to assess his fault. Thus, the
defendant’s behavior is compared with that of a person who does
the same activity as the defendant and is placed in the same
circumstances of time and place. The professional character of the
activity falls into this category. 85
81. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 448, at 375; TERRÉ ET AL.,
supra note 7, § 718, at 694-695; and VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 305.
82. Olivier Moréteau, Post Scriptum to Law Making in a Global World:
From Human Rights to a Law of Mankind, 67 LA. L. REV. 1223, 1228 (2007);
Olivier Moréteau, Faut-il éliminer le « bon père de famille » du Code civil?,
jurexpat.blog.lemonde.fr (blog entry, published 01/25/2014); Olivier Moréteau,
Basic Questions of Tort Law From a French Perspective in BASIC QUESTIONS
OF TORT LAW FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE no. 1/149 (Helmut Koziol
ed., 2015).
83. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 463, at 401; MALAURIE ET AL.,
supra note 7, § 53, at 30; TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 7, § 729, at 701; and VAN
GERVEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 307.
84. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 463, at 402; MALAURIE ET AL.,
supra note 7, § 53, at 30; TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 7, § 729, at 701; and VAN
GERVEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 307.
85. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 464, at 375, § 471, at 410;
TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 7, § 729, at 701; and VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note
6, at 310.
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Courts also account for certain internal circumstances. This is
the case for the physical characteristics of the defendant. For
instance, judges will assess the fault of a child or a disabled person
by comparison with a child of the same age or with a person who is
affected by the same disability. 86 However, the psychological traits
(intelligence, qualities, mental deficiencies, etc.), and cultural and
social characteristics (level of education, background, etc.) do not
necessarily matter to establish the standard of the reasonable
person. 87
2. Inclusion of Negligent Actions and Omissions
Contrary to American law, the breach of the duty of reasonable
care can result, as a general rule, either from an act or from an
omission to act. One of the most famous instances where the law
creates a duty to take action lies in Criminal Code article 223-6.
This provision imposes a duty to act upon anyone who is able “to
prevent by immediate action a felony or a misdemeanor against the
bodily integrity of a person” or “to offer assistance to a person in
danger . . . without risk to himself or to third parties.” Therefore,
the defendant who fails to prevent the perpetration of a crime on
the victim or save him from a dangerous emergency, without risk
to himself or a third party, commits a fault. As a result, the
defendant is accountable to the victim for the damage that the
crime or the emergency caused him. 88
In conclusion, French tort law appears general as it always
binds the defendant to only one standard of care, the harsh standard
of reasonable care, to establish his liability. Nonetheless, it can be
doubted that there are no limitations on the tortfeasor’s liability,
which therefore proves to be relative.
86. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, §§ 467-468 at 405-408; TERRÉ ET
note 7, § 729, at 701; and VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 310.
87. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, §§ 469-470 at 408-409; see VAN
GERVEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 310.
88. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 452, at 381; TERRE ET AL.,
supra note 7, § 721, at 696-97; and VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 281.

AL., supra
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IV. FRANCE’S IMPLIED LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF THE
DEFENDANT’S LIABILITY FOR FAULT
France does recognize that the scope of the defendant’s tort
liability can be sometimes limited based on the enforcement of
different public policies, and accordingly appear relative. In this
case, he no longer owes the general duty of reasonable care.
Instead, he is under a lighter duty or does not owe any duties at all.
However, unlike American law, these limitations are not
clearly expressed in the law. They result from the application of
various legal mechanisms that are involved in establishing the
defendant’s civil responsibility. Therefore, it is necessary to
identify all of these diverse means that cordon off the actor’s
liability. First, the defendant can limit his duty of reasonable care
by invoking the defense of force majeure (A). Then, causation is
used to restrict the scope of tortfeasors’ liability (B). Finally, the
law itself sometimes implicitly imposes a limited duty on some
defendants (C).
A. Limitations of the Duty of Care Based on the Implementation of
the Force Majeure Defense
In French tort law, force majeure is a defense used by
defendants who would otherwise be liable for the damage caused
to their victims. It consists of an unpredictable, superseding event
that makes the defendant unable to foresee and avoid the risk and
damage that his behavior actually causes to the victim. 89 It can take
three forms. First, it can be a natural event (earthquake, storm,
lightening) or third parties’ collective conduct (war). In addition,
the victim’s conduct can constitute such an intervening cause.
Third, the intervening event may correspond to a third party’s
individual conduct (such as the perpetration of a crime). 90
89. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 392, at 265.
90. Id. § 383, at 251-52; MALAURIE ET AL., supra note 7, §§ 194-195, at 9899; TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 7, § 796, at 755; and VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra
note 6, at 434.
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The traditional approach 91 considered that force majeure
actually exonerated an actor from liability only if it was extraneous
(foreign) to the defendant, unforeseeable, and unavoidable. 92
Modern case law and doctrine only require that the tortfeasor did
not provoke the event, 93 and the intervening cause was
unavoidable to immunize him from liability. They especially no
longer demand that force majeure be unforeseeable. Indeed, an
unforeseeable event is allegedly unavoidable by nature, because no
one can prevent something unpredictable from happening.
Accordingly, force majeure’s unforseeability element is considered
as being encompassed in the unavoidability aspect which only
determines the existence of force majeure. 94
However, whether unavoidable based on its unforeseeability or
by itself, force majeure appears to play out as a limitation on the
scope of the defendant’s duty of reasonable care according to
different public policies. On the one hand, when it is deemed
unavoidable based on its unforeseeability, it circumscribes the
defendant’s responsibility to the only risks that he could
reasonably anticipate (1). On the other hand, when an unavoidable
91. See, e.g., Cass. 2e civ., Jan. 5, 1994, Bull. Civ. II, No. 13 (Fr.) (relating
to one’s strict liability for damage caused by things in one’s custody, but also
valid for one’s responsibility for negligence); see also Ass. plén., Apr. 14, 2006,
Bull. civ. Ass. plén. n° 5 (Fr.); JCP, 2006, II, 10087, note P. Grosser (Fr.); D.,
2006., p. 1577, note Patrice Jourdain; and VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 6, at
331, 334.
92. The victim’s misconduct that does not qualify as force majeure can still
constitute contributory negligence and lead to diminishing his compensation.
See, e.g., Cass. 2e civ., Apr. 6, 1987, JCP, 1988, II, 20828, note F. Chabas (Fr.);
D., 1988, p. 32, note C. Mouly (Fr.). Likewise, a third party’s individual conduct
which does not meet the force majeure elements may lessen the defendant’s
liability. He will still be accountable to the victim for the entire damage
according to the French principle of solidary (joint and several) liability between
joint tortfeasors. However, he will have a contribution action against the third
party for his respective share of liability (at least when liability is based on
fault). See, e.g., Cass. 2e civ., Jun. 25, 1970, D., 1971, p. 494, note F. Chabas
(Fr.).
93. Thus, a happening that is internal to the defendant may constitute force
majeure as long as it is not brought about by him (e.g., a disease). See, e.g.,
VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 385, at 254.
94. VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 396, at 270-73; MALAURIE ET AL.,
supra note 7, § 195, at 98, cmt. 83; TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 7, § 798, at 757.
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event qualifies in itself as force majeure, it releases the tortfeasor
from his duty to act reasonably based on the application of other
public policies (2).
1. Circumscribing of the Defendant’s Responsibility to the
Foreseeable Risks
The general rule will be given (a) and an example will be
provided (b).
a. General Rule
French law recognition of unavoidable force majeure based on
its unforeseeability actually causes to limit the scope of the
defendant’s duty of care to the only reasonably foreseeable risks.
Therefore, he is bound to a lighter duty of care and no longer owes
a duty of reasonable care.
Classic French doctrine contends that the liability relief created
by unavoidable force majeure as a result of its unforeseeability
does not constitute an independent limitation on the scope of the
liability of the defendant who is still under a duty of reasonable
care. It argues that the restrictions established by this form of force
majeure rather result from the mere implementation of the
elements of the prima facie case for one’s liability for fault, i.e.,
causation and fault. Thus, on one hand, the existence of
unavoidable force majeure due to its unforeseeability allegedly
overcomes the defendant’s fault in the causal chain. It is only
because a subsequent event later intervened and unexpectedly
modified the chain of causation leading to the victim’s injury that
the tortfeasor’s conduct “created” this damage. Therefore, the force
majeure event is the only cause of the victim’s damage, and the
actor’s conduct is not. 95 On the other hand, the actor is regarded as
not at fault. Indeed, a reasonable and prudent person under the
same (external) circumstances would not have foreseen the risk
95. VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 403, at 284-85.
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created by unavoidable force majeure based on its unforeseeability,
provided that the foreseeability of its occurrence is assessed under
the same reasonable person standard. 96 Therefore, it was
reasonable for the defendant to behave as he did (i.e., injuring the
plaintiff), and he committed no fault. 97
However, it is untrue to assert that the occurrence of
unavoidable force majeure based on its unforeseeability terminates
the causal relationship between the actor’s defective conduct and
the injury in question. According to the equivalence of conditions
(cause in fact) theory, there is causation: the victim would not have
been injured but for the defendant’s fault. 98 Therefore, the liability
relief created by this kind of force majeure is not based on the
mere implementation of the causation element within the
framework of the establishment of one’s liability for fault.
Likewise, the existence of unavoidable force majeure as a
result of its unforeseeability does not necessarily excuse an actor
from liability by taking away his fault. He may still have behaved
unreasonably in this case by failing to prevent damage in general
from occurring to the victim. Therefore, if he is excused from
liability based on the occurrence of unforeseeable force majeure
proving unavoidable, it is rather because he is only bound to a
limited duty to prevent the specific damage that he could
reasonably foresee in order to be held liable for it. 99 A slip-and-fall
case illustrates this.
b. Instance of Publicly-Owned Common Carriers’ Restricted
Duty of Care to Passengers as to the Land Condition
The Cour de Cassation’s ruling of October 9, 1969 shows that
the characterization of unavoidable force majeure based on its
unforeseeability actually leads to limiting the scope of a
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. § 397, at 273-74, § 399, at 278-80.
Id. § 403, at 284-85.
See discussion, supra Part III (Introduction)
See discussion, supra Part II.B.2.b.
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defendant’s duty of care to the only reasonably foreseeable
risks. 100 Here, a passenger of the Paris subway system slipped and
fell on a banana peel that was on the floor in the hallway and sued
the state-owned subway company. It must be specified that at that
time courts bound common carriers to a warranty to ensure their
passengers’ safety while carrying them (even between
connections) and held them liable for a breach thereof, 101 which
was actually similar to tort law. 102
In its ruling, the higher court considered that the metro station
had been swept according to the safety instructions provided by the
regulatory authority. As a result, it held that the banana peel
incident constituted unavoidable force majeure due to its
unforeseeability and released the subway entity from
responsibility. Nevertheless, if the subway company failed to
behave reasonably in sweeping the station to prevent damage in
general from occurring to the victim, it should still have been liable
to him for his slip-and-fall. Therefore, this actually limits the duty
of the subway entity to prevent only the specific damage that it
could reasonably foresee as to its premises such as required by the
cleaning regulations, especially when it is a state-owned entity. 103
On the other hand, when force majeure corresponds to an
irresistible event by itself, it limits the scope of the defendant’s
responsibility based on other public policies.
2. Limits on the Defendant’s Duty of Care Based on Other
Public Policies
The principle will be laid out (a), followed by a case to
illuminate it (b).

100. Cass. 2e civ., Oct. 9, 1968, Bull. Civ. II, No. 231 (Fr.).
101. This liability for warranty breach was even qualified as strict. See
VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 553, at 549. Currently, tortious liability
applies in this case; see, e.g., VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 553, at 551.
102. See discussion, supra Part I.
103. See discussion, supra Part II.B.2.b.
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a. Principle
The existence of unavoidable force majeure in itself, which
excuses the defendant from liability, creates a specific limit on the
scope of his duty of reasonable care based on different public
policies. This is what the analysis of French case law shows
despite the opposite assertion of the classical doctrine. To classical
French scholars, unavoidable force majeure in itself immunizes the
defendant because it takes away his fault. Indeed, the actor usually
takes all the necessary precautions to prevent the damage from
happening. He acts like a reasonable and prudent person under the
same (external) circumstances. It is only because there is an
extraneous damaging event which is bound to happen that he
causes the victim harm. Therefore, the defendant cannot be
considered to have committed any fault nor held liable to the
victim. 104
However, it may occur that the defendant is still at fault in this
type of case. He may prove to have behaved unreasonably by
failing to prevent damage in general from occurring to the victim.
Therefore, if he is relieved from liability as a result of the
occurrence of unavoidable force majeure in itself, it is actually on
the basis that he only owes a limited duty to prevent specific
damage based on the enforcement of public policies in order to be
held liable for it. A case about landowners’ premises liability to
third parties shows that.
b. Example of Landowners’ Limited Liability to Third Parties
off of their Premises
The Cour de cassation’s decision of January 6, 1982
demonstrates that landowners are bound under French law to a
104. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 403, at 284-86; see, e.g., Cass.
2e civ., Mar. 21, 1983, Bull. Civ. II, No. 89 (Fr.) (relating to an aero club not at
fault for failing to prevent an inexperienced pilot from flying a plane and
crashing it into a house after the novice pilot misled the aero club instructor into
giving him control of the plane).
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lighter duty than the standard of reasonable care when the natural
or altered conditions of their premises create risks for people
outside their property. 105 Here, a landowner had erected an
embankment with various materials on his property. Later, a strong
thunderstorm came. Because of the rain, a brook was turned into a
violent torrent which washed away the materials. These objects
eventually ended up blocking a dam, which caused the waterway
to flood a near warehouse and damage all of the merchandise
stored in it. The owner of the warehouse sued the landowner for
his negligence in not securing the materials when knowing a severe
storm was coming.
Referring to Civil Code Article 1382, the French Supreme
Court held that the storm was an irresistible event that qualified as
force majeure and released the landowner from liability for the
damage caused to this third party as a result of the condition of his
premises. However, the landowner may still have acted
unreasonably in not preventing damage in general as a result of the
failure to properly secure the equipment stored on his property in
this hilly area of France where violent storms are frequent.
Accordingly, the liability relief applied here means that the
landowner is only bound to a lighter duty than the duty of
reasonable care as to the specific damage that the condition of his
premises may cause to third parties.
The French conception of the land possessor’s liability can be
compared to the American approach, which also applies a limited
duty rule. The traditional rule is that the landowner does not owe
the persons off the premises a duty to protect them against the risks
created by the natural condition of the premises. 106 If the possessor
or anyone else has altered the natural condition of the land so as to
create or aggravate the risks, the possessor may be bound to a light
duty of care. 107 The California case Keys v. Romley illustrates this
105. Cass. 2e civ., Jan. 6, 1982, Bull. Civ. II, No. 3 (Fr.).
106. See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 231, at 587.
107. Id. § 231, at 590.
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view. 108 Romley (through his lessee) built an ice rink on his
property and paved around the building with asphalt. Around the
same time, the Keys also improved their premises by building a
store on it. They placed the dirt that they excavated at the rear of
the property, which was adjacent to Romley’s parcel. Later, they
decided to remove the dirt and the rain run-off started to flow from
Romley’s property onto their land, which was located at a lower
level. The construction of the rink and the paving on Romley’s
premises was found to be the cause of the flooding.
The Supreme Court of California held that the higher-ground
owner who changed the natural system of drainage could be liable
to the lower-ground owner according to the servitude of natural
drainage. However, this was the case only if he did not take the
reasonable precautions to avoid flooding the adjacent property, and
the lower-ground owner did not reasonably undertake to remedy
the nuisance. 109 Thus, the higher-ground landowner is bound to a
light duty of care. He is no longer required to behave reasonably to
prevent probable risk in general from occurring. It is only if he
acted unreasonably and the defendant reasonably tried to solve the
problem that he is liable. In this case, the higher court held that this
rule was in the support of the public policy of improving the land
and remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether
Romley’s liability arises from the flow path depending on the
reasonableness of the removal of the dirt pile by the Keys. 110
Judges also use causation as a method for limiting the scope of
the defendant’s liability.
B. Application of the Adequacy Theory to Limit Tortfeasors’
Responsibility
French judges may limit the defendant’s duty of care by setting
aside the equivalence of conditions theory (or cause in fact theory)
108. Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396 (1966).
109. Id. at 409.
110. Id. at 411.
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and applying other causation standards, such as the adequacy
theory. This mostly involves cases where several events combine
to cause the plaintiff’s indivisible injury. 111 According to the
equivalence of conditions theory, each event that is a necessary
antecedent of the occurrence of the accident should be recognized
as the cause of the damage and lead to the perpetrator’s liability. 112
However, under the adequacy theory, courts will qualify as
“cause” only those events which, in reference to the scientific
knowledge at the time they occur, can normally and foreseeably
create the harm. 113 In doing so, courts actually intend to balance
the equity and limit certain clumsy actors’ duty in order to better
punish more delinquent tortfeasors. This especially occurs when
defendants commit greatly uneven faults (1) or cause subsequent
damage remote in time (2).
1. Exoneration of Slight Faults in Presence of a Grave Fault
Judges use causation to limit the duty of care of actors whose
slight faults combine with a more serious one to bring about the
victim’s damage. They consider that, under the adequacy theory,
the gravest fault constitutes the only cause of the injury and
excuses all the perpetrators of the slight faults from liability. 114
Nevertheless, all those faults caused in fact the harm and should
lead to the defendants’ liability. Therefore, this means that France
implements relative tort liability and slightly faulty defendants
have no duty of care in the presence of a tortfeasor committing a
grave fault.
The classical example of an accident caused by a stolen car
illustrates this idea. In a March 4, 1981 case, Mrs. X left her car
111. When defendants’ different conducts caused the plaintiff separate
damage, their behavior is regarded as the cause of only the part of the damage
they brought about. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 381, at 247.
112. See discussion, supra Part III (Introduction).
113. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 340, at 188-89; MALAURIE ET
AL., supra note 7, § 93, at 45; and TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 7, § 860, at 816.
114. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 357, at 202; see VAN GERVEN
ET AL., supra note 6, at 420.
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with the doors unlocked and the key in the ignition in front of her
nephew’s house at night. 115 Later, the nephew and his delinquent
friends stole the car and collided with another car. The driver of
the other vehicle sued the aunt for negligence. The Cour de
Cassation ruled that only the nephew’s grave negligent driving
was the cause of the collision. Mrs. X’s alleged negligence did not
constitute the cause of the accident. As a result, it dismissed the
claim against the aunt for negligence.
Here, it is of note that negligence on the part of the car owner
applies. She unreasonably left her car on a city street, unlocked,
with the keys in the ignition, thereby opening the way for a thief to
steal it and have a car accident with it. Therefore, cause in fact was
established as the thief would not have stolen the car and caused an
accident but for the owner’s negligence in leaving it unlocked. 116
Thus, when French Justices consider that the owner’s
negligence in leaving his car unlocked with the keys in the ignition
may never be the cause of the car accident between the thief and
the victim, they actually limit his duty of care. According to the
equivalence of conditions theory, there is causation. If car owners
are not liable in fact, it is rather because their duty does not extend
to third parties’ criminal conduct.
Defendant’s liability is also excluded for subsequent damage
too remote in time.
2. Liability Exclusion for Subsequent Damage too Remote in
Time
When a prior accident concurred with a second event to bring
about new damage, case law often uses the adequacy theory to
decide that only the second incident caused the new injury. The
previous accident remote in time is left out of the causal chain,
though it was a necessary antecedent according to the equivalence
115. Cass. 2e civ., Mar. 4, 1981, Bull. Civ. II, No. 49 (Fr.).
116. For an example of such a decision in American law, see, e.g., DOBBS,
supra note 2, § 182, at 449.
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of conditions theory. This aims to limit the scope of tortfeasors’
liability by releasing them from indefinite responsibility for the
subsequent damage brought about by their original negligence.
A Cour de Cassation ruling of February 8, 1989 emphasizes
this point.117 Mr. Y became physically disabled after a car accident
with Mr. X, who was entirely liable. Mr. Y had to be continuously
assisted in moving around. Ten years after the car collision, the
bed on which the victim was laying caught on fire, and Mr. Y, who
could not move out of his bed, died in the fire. The widow brought
a wrongful death and survival action against the negligent driver
and his insurance company to recover damages.
The Court of Cassation decided that only the event nearer in
time, that is, the fire, was the cause of the disabled man’s death. It
rejected the argument that the prior car accident which occurred 10
years earlier also concurred to bring about Mr. Y’s death. Indeed,
after the crash, Mr. X and his insurer had paid Mr. Y damages for
getting help to especially prevent this kind of disaster from
happening. Therefore, the Court excused the negligent driver and
his insurance firm from liability.
However, according to the equivalence of conditions theory,
the prior accident is the cause of the subsequent damage, since the
latter would not have occurred without the former. In real life, this
case demonstrates that judges do not intend to extend the scope of
initial tortfeasors’ liability to too remote subsequent damage
resulting from their original negligence. Otherwise, anyone would
be endlessly liable for his negligence.
Finally, French law may itself impose specific limited duty on
some tortfeasors to limit the scope of their liability.
C. Acknowledgement of Defendants’ Specific Limited Duties
In some instances, defendants may bear a limited duty of care.
This is the case for employees’ implied limited liability for damage
117. Cass. 2e civ., Feb. 8, 1989, Bull. Civ. II, No. 39 (Fr.).
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to third parties arising out of the performance of their job (1) and
some parties’ limited warranty liability (2).
1. Employees’ Implied Limited Liability for Damage Arising
out of the Performance of Their Job Tasks
Under French law, the general rule is that employees are
subject to limited liability as to the damage they cause to third
parties during the performance of their job tasks. In the meantime,
it must be emphasized that French employers bear vicarious
liability for the torts of their employees when there is an
employment relationship and the latter were acting within the
scope of their employment, as do American employers. 118 First, an
employment relationship exists when the employer has the right to
exercise some degree of direction and control over his
employee, 119 such as in an employment contract ((whereby the
employer determines the physical details (time, place, method,
etc.) of the performance of the work and fires his employees))120
but not in an independent agency contract. 121 An employee is then
considered acting within the scope of his employment when he
performs his job tasks (or at least was within the place and time of
work or used the company’s tools or other means when the
accident occurred) or follows his employer’s instructions or
attempts to act for the benefit of the company. 122
It was the French Supreme Court’s case of February 25, 2000
which first decided in favor of French employees’ limited liability

118. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 809, at 1012; and VAN GERVEN
supra note 6, at 469.
119. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 792, at 980-82; and VAN
GERVEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 469.
120. See VINEY & JOURDAIN., supra note 6, § 793, at 982-87.
121. Id. § 795-1, at 988. Also see MALAURIE ET AL., supra note 7, § 160, at
77; and TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 7, § 830, at 785.
122. Ass. Plén., May 19, 1988, D., 1988, p. 525, note C. Larroumet (Fr.),
Also see VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 804, at 1005; MALAURIE ET AL.,
supra note 7, § 164, at 80; and TERRÉ ET AL., supra note 7, §§ 834-835, at 78995.
ET AL.,
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for damage arising out of the performance of their job tasks.123
Here, a pilot of a helicopter spread pesticide over a field during a
windy day, in accordance with his job tasks. The wind caused the
chemicals to reach adjacent fields. Based on former French case
law holding that an employee was jointly and severally liable with
his employer for his negligence falling within the scope of his
employment, the owners of these lands sued the pilot and his
employer, the helicopter company, for the damage to their
property. Nevertheless, the Higher Court considered that the pilot’s
negligence (spreading the pesticides during a windy day) arose
from the performance of his job tasks which his employer had
entrusted to him and therefore excused him from liability. Only his
employer was to be found liable. Thus, this means that employees,
acting within the scope of their employment, have an implied
limited duty that excludes liability for the damage caused to
victims while performing a specific task which their employer
entrusted to them at the time of the accident.
In summary, when an employee follows his superior’s order
which falls within with his lawful job description, he is immune
from liability, and only his employer is vicariously liable for his
negligence under the respondeat superior doctrine. 124 However,
when he violates his lawful job description at his employer’s
request and commits negligence or intentional torts (that can also
be criminal offences), he is liable for the damage to the victim, as
is his employer, under vicarious liability. Finally, when he
disobeys his superiors’ instruction or pursues his own interest with
no advantage to the company, he is liable alone (employer’s
vicarious liability does not apply here). 125

123. Ass. Plén., Feb. 25, 2000, JCP, G, 2000, II, 10295, concl. Kessous, note
M. Billiau (Fr.); D., 2000, J. p. 673, note P. Brun (Fr.).
124. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 812-1, at 1025.
125. Id.
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2. Parties’ Limited Warranty Liability
When a party performs his contract requiring the achievement
of work or services, he may be bound to a limited warranty lighter
than the warranty of workmanlike performance (which is similar to
U.S. tort law). As a result, he bears limited liability for the bodily
injury and property damage caused to the opposing party while
performing the contract. 126
For instance, in a bailment, unless there is monetary
consideration or the bailee benefits from it, the bailee is bound to a
warranty to care as much for the property in his possession as he
does for his own property. 127 As a result, if he is used to caring for
his belongings worse than a reasonable person does, he will be
bound to a limited warranty causing him to have lighter liability
for the property damage to the bailor.
In conclusion, French tort law appears to be based on a
misunderstanding. On the one hand, it states that it applies general
fault-based tort liability, and everyone is bound to the duty of
reasonable care. On the other hand, it diverts the different elements
of the prima facie case for people’s liability for fault to limit the
scope of their duty of reasonable care and implements relative tort
liability. Therefore, it would be better to publicly recognize that
there is no longer a general principle of liability for fault and the
scope of one’s fault-based liability may be limited for public policy
considerations.
V. A NEW APPROACH IN FRENCH LAW: THE INTRODUCTION OF THE
(LIMITED) DUTY REQUIREMENT INTO FAULT-BASED TORT
LIABILITY
The official acknowledgement of the existence of limitations
on the scope of the defendant’s duty would definitively cause
French tort law to switch from a system based on general fault126. Noting that parties can also provide for their own liability limitations in
the contract. See discussion, supra Part I.
127. See arts. 1927 & 1928 C. CIV.
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based tort liability to a system that applies relative responsibility.
France could continue to implement a single liability clause
providing for the liability of those who intentionally or negligently
breach the duty of care. However, tortfeasors would not always be
bound to the duty of reasonable care. They could owe a lighter
duty or no duty at all. It would be up to victims to prove the
existence of duties of care on the part of defendants to hold them
liable. 128 According to the French traditional principle of separate
power, the legislature should determine the various public policies
driving the duties of care, and the judiciary should only implement
them.
This relative liability approach would present two main
advantages. First, it would improve the organization of the law
(A). Second, French tort law would become more consistent with
the Principles of European Tort Law 129 and other European
countries’ tort law to improve economic efficiency in the European
Union (B).
A. Improved Organization of the Law
The adoption of the concept of relative tortious liability leads
to better foreseeability of the law (1) and helps draw the line
between liability for fault and other liabilities (2).
1. Better Foreseeability of the Law
One of the advantages of circumscribing the scope of
individuals’ duty is to establish clear and abstract categories of
negligence liability situations according to public policies and a
hierarchy between the various protected rights. Everyone would
know when he is liable to certain classes of people for specific
types of risks, and when he is not. Thus, individuals can predict the
128. This approach is already implemented when the defendant’s liability is
based on a breach of warranties; see discussion, supra Part IV.C.2.
129. As set forth in EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN TORT LAW (Springer 2005).

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

70

[Vol. 8

outcome of their behavior, and in some cases, adjust it in order to
be immunized from liability. This foreseeability enhances the
economic efficiency of society. 130
For instance, it could be highlighted that economically weaker
victims are usually protected by the law. This is illustrated by
employees’ liability exclusion for damage caused during the
performance of the specific task which their employers entrusted to
them within their job descriptions. 131 Here, employees are subject
to indemnification claims by their employers who compensate
victims under the respondeat superior doctrine. However, these
employees did not profit from their wrongdoing and are not usually
insured for it, unlike their superiors. Therefore, they are the
economically weakest parties and are immunized from liability.
At the same time, it could be pointed out that French law
promotes economic efficiency. For instance, courts allow business
entities to operate at a lower cost to ensure the provision of
valuable public services by freeing them from certain
unforeseeable liability, such as shown in frivolous slip-and-fall
cases. 132 In addition, a landowner can reasonably improve his land
to conduct affairs without risking unjustified lawsuits. 133 Lastly,
the law sets limits on people’s liability for subsequent damage
resulting from their original negligence. It does not want them to
be infinitely liable for their conduct and dissuade all economic
ventures. 134
2. Drawing the Line between Fault-Based Tort Liability and
Other Liabilities
First, the adoption of the relative liability rule could allow
French law to better distinguish between fault-based tort liability
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 182, at 450.
See discussion, supra Part IV.C.1.
See discussion, supra Part IV.A.1.b.
See discussion, supra Part IV.A.2.b.
See discussion, supra Part IV.B.2.
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and strict liability. 135 As a general rule, according to the Latin
adage specialia generalibus derogant, judges must exclusively rely
on the specific law of strict liability when they decide a case which
falls within the framework of this regime. They cannot apply faultbased liability in its stead. It said that liability without fault
excludes civil responsibility for fault. In other words, if the
plaintiff does not meet the requirements to hold the defendant
strictly liable, he cannot then invoke his fault as a second shot at
the defendant. He is barred from recovery. Liability for fault only
applies when there are no other specific regimes which preempt
it. 136 However, in practice, judges loosely follow this rule and
often turn to fault-based liability when strict liability cannot be
established. 137 The remedy for this problem could be that courts
neutralize the defendant’s duty of care in civil responsibility for
fault (which therefore would no longer apply) when strict liability
applies. Thus, judges would be bound to apply only strict liability
when they decide a case which falls within the boundaries of this
regime. It would be impossible for them to resort to liability for
fault in this situation.138
Second, it could be argued that the defendant’s limited duty of
care under one’s liability for fault is restricted if he fails to act
reasonably while performing a contract. As a result, his liability
would only be dealt with under warranty breach, so that he can be
able to provide for contractual liability limits. 139
The adoption of the scope of duty approach in French law
would make it closer to the Principles of European Tort Law which
intend to harmonize the European Union countries’ tort law.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See supra note 1.
See VINEY, supra note 8, at 44-45.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 45.
See discussion, supra Part I.
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B. Harmonization with the Principles of European Tort Law
The public acknowledgement in France of the existence of
limitations on the scope of defendants’ duty within the framework
of its single liability clause would line French law up with the
Principles of European Tort Law. 140 Indeed, this European tort law
project 141 adopts the single liability clause providing for the civil
liability of all those who cause damage by intentionally or nonintentionally breaching the duty of care (called fault). 142 It also
recognizes that the scope of defendants’ liability may be limited
based on the enforcement of public policy considerations. They
may not always be bound to a duty of reasonable care—it can be a
lighter one. As a result, the Principles of European Tort Law
implement the principle of relative tort liability. It is set forth in
chapter 3, section 2, article 3:201, which reads:
Art. 3:201. Scope of Liability
Where an activity is a cause within the meaning of Section
1 of this Chapter [cause-in-fact], whether and to what
extent damage may be attributed to a person depends on
factors such as:
a) the foreseeablity of the damage to a reasonable person at
the time of the activity, taking into account in particular the
closeness in time and space between the damaging activity
and its consequences, or the magnitude of the damage in
relation to the normal consequences of such an activity;
140. See EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, supra note 129.
141. The Principles are an attempt to harmonize the European Union
countries’ tort law and create set of united rules to be implemented in European
countries. They have been drafted by the European Group on Tort Law mainly
composed of European scholars specializing in the field, but also including
leading scholars from the United States, Israel, and South Africa. They have not
been enacted as such by the different European countries or the European Union
itself, and, therefore, do not have statutory authority. They only have the
authority as the product of the scholars’ piece of work. In this sense, they are
very similar to the American Restatements of the Law. See Bernhard A. Koch,
The “European Group on Tort Law” and its “Principles of European Tort
Law”, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 189, 189-93.
142. EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, supra note 129, at art. 4:101.
However, the comments emphasize that strict liability (risk based liability and
liability for others) constitutes an exception to the single liability clause. See id.
at art. 4:101, cmt. 6.
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b) the nature and the value of the protected interests (article
2:102);
c) the basis of liability (article 1:101);
d) the extent of the ordinary risks of life; and
e) the protective purpose of the rule that has been
violated. 143
Further, this would not cause an important change in French
law. Indeed, when France diverts the different elements of
defendants’ liability for fault to limit the scope of their
responsibility, it does so based on the enforcement of the same
public policies as in the Principles. Thus, the scope of the
defendant’s duty can be limited to the foreseeable risks in both
systems. 144 Conversely, tortfeasors are bound to a full duty of
reasonable care when they cause death or severe bodily injury.
Finally, the adoption of the limited liability rule in France seems to
be highly advantageous to further integration with the other EU
countries.
VI. CONCLUSION
The general principle of liability for fault as applied by France
proves insufficient to organize people’s liability for their
misconduct and allocate the loss caused by each other. Modern
societies have to carry on the rule of relative responsibility and
limit the scope of individuals’ duty of reasonable care in certain
situations. This leads to more efficient apportionment of harm
between the different actors. Depending on public policies, France
jurisprudence itself already limits the scope of such a duty of care
by diverting the elements of one’s liability for fault. This
demonstrates that French law should go further in this direction,
and French doctrine should openly recognize the existence of
limited duties of care under the single clause governing fault-based

143. Id. at art. 3:201.
144. See, e.g., discussion, supra Part IV.A.1.a.
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tort liability in order to be harmonized with its European
neighbors’ tort law.

